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RECENT LEGISLATION
Housing-VIRGINIA ATTAcKs BLOCKBUSTING-VA. CODE ANN. § 36-89 (Cum.
Supp. 1972).
Discrimination in housing along racial, religious, ethnic, and class lines
has long been a problem in the United States. The most widespread methods
of housing discrimination have included preferential advertising, soliciting,
and showings in housing sales and rentals. In recent years another type of
discriminatory scheme, commonly referred to as blockbusting,' has surfaced.
Blockbusting has been defined as "the practice of inducing owners of prop-
erty to sell because of the actual or rumored advent into the neighborhood
of a member of a racial, religious or ethnic group." 2 Typically, the block-
buster preys upon the fears and prejudices of white property owners by
representing that the white neighborhood is "'going colored,'" 8 and that
a decline in property values and quality of housing is inevitable. 4 As a re-
sult, property owners often sell their homes for less than the actual value
to the blockbuster, who in turn resells to blacks at inflated rates, thus cheat-
ing both the white seller and the black purchaser. 5
To prevent discrimination and the creation of ghettos, to promote fair-
ness in real estate transactions, and to promote community stability and
interracial harmony,6 blockbusting regulations7 have been promulgated
I Blockbusting is also called "panic peddling." Chicago Real Estate Bd. v. City of
Chicago, 36 Ill.2d 530, 224 N.E.2d 793, 797 (1967).
2 Summer v. Township of Teaneck, 53 N.J. 548, 251 A.2d 761, 762-63 (1969).
8 Brown v. State Realty Co., 304 F. Supp. 1236, 1237 (N.D. Ga. 1969). The blockbuster
may also spread the rumor that other owners in the neighborhood have already sold
and even place "sold" signs throughout the neighborhood attempting to show evidence
of this. Id. at 1238. See also Glassberg, Legal Control of Blockbusting, 1972 URBAN L.
ANNUAL 145, 145-46 nn. 1 & 2 [hereinafter cited as Glassberg], noting that "the block-
buster may hire black welfare mothers to parade up and down the block, or vandals to
throw bricks through windows, in order to foster the impression of a black invasion."
4 United States v. Mitchell, 327 F. Supp. 476, 478 (ND. Ga. 1971).
5 Contract Buyers League v. F & F Investment Co., 300 F. Supp. 210, 214 (N.D. Ill.
1969); Summer v. Township of Teaneck, 53 N.J. 548, 251 A.2d 761, 763 (1969).
6 Glassberg, supra note 3, at 148 & nn. 15,16,17.
7 Cf. Note, Bockbusting, 59 GEo. L. J. 170, 171, 172 & nn. 12. 13, 14 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Blockbusting]. Neighborhood associations have also been formed to combat
blockbusting attempts. Although these groups have strong persuasive powers within the
community, their powers are limited to just that-persuasion and influence. They cannot
prevent homeowners from selling nor can they control the actions of realtors.
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on federal,8 state,9 and local'0 levels. When they first appeared, a very real
concern emerged as to their constitutionality in light of the first amend-
ment. These statutes have survived the challenge, however, and a major
basis for their survival has been the courts' reliance on the United States
Supreme Court's ruling that speech in a commercial context is not an abso-
lute right and can be regulated.' Some courts have shunned this basis when
interstate commerce cannot be shown, and have relied instead upon the
thirteenth amendment, which "clothed Congress with power to pass all laws
necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery." 12
Considering these decisions, future blockbusting legislation should weather
well any constitutional challenge it might face.
In an effort to expand Virginia law to encourage fair dealing in housing,
and to prevent this often subtle form of discrimination, a blockbusting pro-
visioni 3 was recently enacted within the Virginia Fair Housing Law of
1972.14 This provision, Va. Code Ann. § 36-89 (Cum. Supp. 1972), is di-
vided into two paragraphs each aimed at a particular discriminatory evil.
842 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1970).
0 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1016 (Cum. Supp. 1971); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §
344.380 (1971); MD. CODE ANN. art. 56, § 230A (1972); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112,
§ 87AAA (Cum. Supp. 1972); OHio Rv. CoDE. ANN. § 4112.02(H) (9) (1971); W. Va.
CoD ANN. § 5-11-9 (i) (4) (1971);
10 ALmNDRiA, VA., CODE § 17A-4 (1969); Chicago, Ill., Fair Housing Ordinance, Sept.
11, 1963; Teaneck, N.J., Ordinance 1274 (1966).
11 Breard v. Alexandria, 341 US. 622, 642 (1951); United States v. Bob Lawrence
Realty, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 870, 872 (N.D. Ga. 1970); Chicago Real Estate Bd. v. City of
Chicago, 36 Ill.2d 530, 224 N.E. 2d 793, 807 (1967).
12 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968). This court concluded that
it was not irrational to consider discrimination in the sale or rental of housing as a
badge of slavery. Id. at 440. This in effect furnished a constitutional basis for the advent
of fair housing laws. Both Brown v. State Realty Co., 304 F. Supp. 1236, 1239 (N.D. Ga.
1969) and United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305, 1313 (D. Md. 1969) followed the
reasoning of Jones and held that blockbusting legislation was a rational and reasonable
means of effectuating a policy of providing fair housing throughout the United States.
1a VA. CODE ANN. § 36-89 (Cum. Supp. 1972):
Attempting to Induce or Discourage Transfer of Property; Soliciting Listing of
Dwellings for Sale or Lease-It shall further be an unlawful discriminatory housing
practice:
(a) For any person, firm, corporation or association, acting for monetary gain,
knowingly to induce or attempt to induce another person to transfer an interest
in real property or to discourage another person from purchasing real property,
by representations regarding the existing or potential proximity of real property
owned, used, or occupied by persons of any particular race, color, religion or
national origin.
(b) For any person, firm, corporation or association to solicit or attempt to
solicit the listing of dwellings for sale or lease, by door to door solicitation, in
person or by telephone, or by mass distribution of circulars, for the purpose of
changing the racial composition of the neighborhood.
14VA. CoDa ANNt. §§ 36-86 to -96 (Cum. Supp. 1972). This new housing law was
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Paragraph (a), the core of the anti-blockbusting statute, deals with the
actual attempt of the blockbuster to discourage or encourage sales of real
property.15 To come under its provisions a person or organization must be
acting for monetary gain.' This stipulation is similar to the federal require-
ment that a blockbuster must be acting for profit.17 "For profit" has been
interpreted to mean for the purpose of obtaining financial gain in any form. 8
However, the federal statute does not require that profit or monetary gain
actually be realized, although the financial motive is essential.' 9 The Virginia
statute will probably be interpreted similarly. One should note that not
only may the blockbuster fail in his quest for monetary gain, but that he
may also fail to persuade his victims to transfer or purchase real property
interests, and still be prosecuted; mere attempts are punishable.20
The test of liability is not success in blockbusting, but rather the making
of "representations regarding the existing or potential proximity of real
sponsored by Dr. William P. Robinson, Sr., a member of the Virginia House of Dele-
gates and Chairman of the Department of Political Science of Norfolk State College.
With the assistance of the Virginia Department of Statutory Research and Drafting,
Dr. Robinson's fair housing bill was drafted several times before it reached the House
of Delegates. In its final form it closely resembled the Federal Fair Housing Law of
1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601-31 (1970). The blockbusting provision in particular was origi-
nally modeled after MD. CODE ANN. art. 49B, § 22A (1966), but underwent significant
changes on the floor of the House. See note 16 infra. Telephone interview with Dr.
William P. Robinson, Sr, Sept. 8, 1972.
15 VA. CoDE ANN. § 36-89 (a) (Cum. Supp. 1972).16 Id. Originally VA. CODE ANN. § 36-89 (Cum. Supp. 1972) had contained a phrase
from MD. CoDE ANN. art. 49B, § 22A (1972) prescribing punishment for the blockbuster
"whether or not [he was] acting for monetary gain," but it was deleted by Dr. Robin-
son, who felt that this phrase severely and unconstitutionally restricted one's freedom
of speech. Telephone interview with Dr. William P. Robinson, Sr., Sept. 8, 1972. Re-
cently the Maryland statute withstood the test of constitutionality in State v. Wagner,
-Md.-, 291 A.2d 161 (1972). The court stated that nothing in the statute itself made
mere speech unlawful; instead, the statute prohibited "a course of conduct manifested
in part by the making of proscribed representations.... [Wihere speech is an integral
part of unlawful conduct, it has no constitutional protection:' Id. at -, 291 A2d at 166.
1742 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1970).
18 United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305, 1311 (D. Md. 1969). The court was quick
to stress that "for profit" includes, but is not limited to, the purchase of property with
hopes of selling it for an increased price. "[The words 'for profit'] were evidently in-
cluded [in the federal statute] to distinguish and eliminate from [its] operation. ...
statements made in social, political or other contexts, as distinguished from a commercial
context.. .. " Id. at 1312.
19 Brown v. State Realty Co., 304 F. Supp. 1236, 1241 (N.D. Ga. 1969). But see MD.
CODE ANN. art. 56, § 230A (1972). Although the federal statute makes this limitation,
a slight majority of state statutes and municipal ordinances, recognizing that persons
motivated by political and social beliefs alone may be instrumental in blockbusting,
have omitted this requirement from their statutes. Glassberg, supra note 3, at 159 nn. 87,
88, 89.2 0 Brown v. State Realty Co, 304 F. Supp. 1236, 1241 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
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property owned, used or occupied by persons of any particular race, color,
religion or national origin." 21 This type of general language exists in all
blockbusting statutes and has been interpreted to include such statements
as "going colored," 22 "a changing neighborhood," 23 or "undesirable ele-
ment."24 It has been held that the only intent necessary to violate such
statutes is the intent to make these representations for the purpose of induc-
ing property transfers. 25
Paragraph (b), an ancillary to paragraph (a), deals with the offenders'
attempts at soliciting the listings of dwellings for discriminatory purposes. 26
This particular area of blockbusting is rarely included in anti-blockbusting
regulations. Although some states have passed sweeping anti-solicitation laws
applicable to all door-to-door solicitors,27 Virginia has chosen a more limited
approach by confining its anti-solicitation restriction to blockbusters. Anti-
solicitation laws of other jurisdictions, which have not been limited to those
solicitors whose purpose is to change "the racial composition of the neigh-
borhood," 28 have left some areas of solicitation, such as advertising in news-
papers, television, and magazines, unaffected.29 These omissions allow such
statutes to sufficiently comply with the due process test, that prevents un-
reasonable restraint on the pursuit of lawful occupation so Paragraph (b)
also omits reference to advertising, leaving open that channel of solicitation.
However, because it also is directed so pointedly at an unlawful occupation,
paragraph (b) might not have needed these open channels to survive a due
21 VA. CoDE AwN. § 36-89(a) (Cum. Supp. 1972). Compare United States v. Mintzes,
304 F. Supp. 1305 (D.Md. 1969), holding that such representations need not be false
to be actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1970), which like the Virginia provision
omits reference to falsity or truthfulness, with Abel v. Lomenzo, 25 App. Div.2d 104,
267 N.Y.S.2d 265, aff'd mem., 18 N.Y.2d 619, N.5.2d 287, 272 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1966) holding
the truth of the representations to be a defense to blockbusting.22 Brown v. State Realty Co., 304 F. Supp. 1236, 1237 (ND. Ga. 1969).
23 United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305, 1310 (D. Md. 1969).
24 Id.
25 d. at 1311. In Mintzes the defendant contended that the plaintiff must also prove
that the defendant had made the alleged representations with the intent to deny persons
protected by the statute, a right granted by the statute; the court disagreed. In, Brown
v. State Realty Co., 304 F. Supp. 1236, 1241 (N. D. Ga. 1969), the court stated that the
statute required one to "refrain absolutely from any such representations."
26 VA. CODE AN. § 36-89(b) (Cum. Supp. 1972).
27 Nicknamed the Green River Ordinances, because the Green River, Wyoming
ordinance was the first tested and upheld, these laws vary in their approach. They gen-
erally prohibit all solicitation made without prior consent of the homeowner. Green
River v. Fuller Brush Co., 65 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1933). However, they may also require
permits to solicit. Mogolefsky v. Schoem, 50 NJ. 588, 236 A.2d 874, 882 (1967).28 VA. CODE AxN. § 36-89(b) (Cum. Supp. 1972).
2 9 Alexandria, La., Penal Ordinance 500 quoted in Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622,
624 (1951); Green River, Wyo., Ordinance 175, November 16, 1931.8 OIn Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 631-32 (1951) the court sustained an anti-
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process challenge.3' Nevertheless, it is a positive step towards discouraging
blockbusting in one of its more subtle forms.
Perhaps the most significant features behind Virginia's anti-blockbusting
law lie in its method of enforcement and limits of punishment provided in
Va. Code Ann. §§ 36-94 and 95 (Cum. Supp. 1972).32 These sections provide
direct avenues of remedy without long waiting periods or resort to con-
ciliation before going to court.3s Individuals may make complaints through
the Attorney General without fear of statutory delay before instituting
private suit should their complaint to him prove unavailing.3 4 The one major
encumbrance of the section on civil action by the Attorney General3 5 is
solicitation ordinance on grounds that only door-to-door solicitations were forbidden.
Since solicitation through other means was not restricted, the ordinance was not an
unreasonable restraint of lawful occupation.
a1 See also Ch. 493, tit. C, § C1-4.0 [19701 LAws OF N.Y. 1133-34, which expressly ex-
cludes certain methods of solicitation from its prohibitions. But see Glassberg, supra
note 3, at 167. For a general discussion of the New York law see Note, Blockbusting: A
Novel Statutory Approach to an Increasingly Serious Problem, 7 COLUM. J. L. & Soc.
PROB. 538, 558-70 (1971).
82 VA. CoDE ANN. § 36-94:
Powers of Attorney General; Action by Private Person for Injunction and Liqui-
dated Damages-(a) The Attorney General has the power for the purposes of this
chapter to receive complaints, conduct investigations and enforce by civil in-junction, in the name of the Commonwealth, any violation of . . . § 36-89.
(b) Any person adversely affected by use of a discriminatory practice prohibited
under § 36-89 ... may institute an action for injunction and liquidated damages
against the person responsible for such discriminatory practice in the court of
record having equity jurisdiction in the county or city in which such practice
was employed. If the court find that the defendant was responsible for such a
practice and that the plaintiff was adversely affected thereby, it shall enjoin the
defendant from use of such practice, and in its discretion award the plaintiff
up to two hundred fifty dollars liquidated damages.
VA. CODE ANN. § 36-95 (Cum. Supp. 1972):
Civil Action by Attorney General-If at any time after a complaint has been
filed, the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that appropriate civil
action to preserve the status quo or to prevent irreparable harm is advisable, the
Attorney General may bring an action necessary to preserve such status quo or
to prevent such irreparable harm, including but not limited to an action to obtain
a temporary restraining order and for a preliminary injunction. Such action shall
be brought in the circuit or corporation court of the county or city where is
located the dwelling which is the subject of the alleged discrimination.
33 Such conciliation procedures, as required in 42 U.S.C. § 3608-11 (1970), were what
Dr. Robinson, the Virginia sponsor, hoped to avoid for he considers the federal pro-
cedures "a house of horrors." Telephone interview with Dr. William P. Robinson, Sept.
8, 1972. For a discussion of federal enforcement procedures see Blockbusting, supra note
7, at 176-82.
34 Contra, 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d) (1970), where the defendant who files with the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development faces at least a thirty day statutory delay
before instituting suit.
3 5 VA. CODE ANN. § 36-95 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
RECENT LEGISLATION
the restriction that he may bring an action only after a complaint is filed
with him.tu
Once enforcement procedures have been initiated, the injured party in a
private suit may receive injunctive relief and liquidated damages up to
$250W Although injunctive relief attempts to prevent further infringe-
ments upon individual rights, it is clearly an inadequate remedy for those
who have already sold their homes at depressed prices or bought from the
blockbuster at an inflated price. While other statutes have specifically stated
that a plaintiff may seek actual damages,38 Virginia's statute is silent, leaving
the injured party to resort to equitable remedies. 9 The liquidated damages
provision does attempt to introduce a financial deterrent to the blockbuster,
and offers some benefit to his victim. As a practical matter, however, $250
is woefully inadequate to deter those blockbusters who reap large pecuniary
profits, or to reimburse defrauded home owners for their usually heavy
losses40
Viewing its purposes, prohibitions, and penalties, the Virginia statute rep-
resents a progressive step for Virginia in the field of civil rights. Its weakest
points lie in the leniency of punishment prescribed for the blockbuster and
its silence concerning the receipt of actual damages by the victims. Its
strongest point lies in its strict anti-solicitation policy which, although ur-
gently needed in all blockbusting statutes, is often not included.
A. W. W.
3 This could be a drawback to the prevention of blockbusting which was well
Imown throughout the community but of which no one had filed a complaint. See also
United States v. Mitchell, 327 F. Supp. 476, 480-83 (ND. Ga. 1971) and United States
v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 487, 492-93 (ND. Ga. 1971) discussing fed-
eral law. Under 42 US.C. § 3613 (1968) the United States Attorney General may bring
a civil action "[wihenever [he] has reasonable cause to believe that any person or
group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment
of any rights granted by [the Fair Housing Law of 1968]." Although the action here
requires no prior complaint to the United States Attorney General, it may involve
proof problems concerning the definition of "pattern or practice," which are not faced
by the Virginia Attorney General.
37 VA. CODE ANN. § 36-94(b) (Cum. Supp. 1972).
842 U. S. C. § 3612 (1970); Ch. 493, tit. C, § C1-8.0 [1970] LAws OF N.Y. 1134-35.
39 There is a split of authority concerning the plaintiff's right to seek relief through
remedies not specifically provided for by the statute. One line of cases follows Everett
v. Harron, 300 Pa. 123, 110 A.2d 383, 385-87 (1955) reasoning that: "[Ilf [one] neglects
or refuses to perform [a specific duty imposed upon him by statute, then] he is liable
for injury caused by such neglect or refusal" regardless of a damage provision's inclu-
sion in the statute. The other line of thought states that "[w]here [a] statute creates
a new right and at the same time provides remedies or penalties for its violation, the
courts may not intervene and impose an additional remedy." Fletcher v. Coney Island,
Inc., 165 Ohio St. 150, 134 N.E.2d 371, 374 (1956).
40Even the federal statute which allows up to $1,000 punitive damages has been
criticized as being too lenient. Blockbusting, supra note 7, at 180 n. 81.
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